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Research Spotlight
The Internal Markets of Multinational Firms
By Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr.
HE rising economic importance of multinational
firms has been accompanied by significant
changes in their structure and functioning. Multina-
tional firms, historically characterized as webs of au-
tonomous subsidiaries spread across countries, now
represent globally integrated production systems serv-
ing worldwide customers. These changes are manifest
in the rising significance of intrafirm trade and finan-
cial flows for these firms. While there is extensive anal-
ysis of aggregate patterns in intrafirm flows of goods
and capital, few firm-based studies examine the work-
ings of the internal markets of multinational firms,
largely because of the difficulty in accessing the neces-
sary data.
A number of our recent projects investigated the in-
ternal markets of U.S. multinational firms. Our re-
search demonstrates that internal market operations
represent a critical aspect of firm responses to costly
external finance, capital controls, and currency fluctu-
ations. Our research also shows that the changing na-
comes. The variety of operating information for parent
companies and their affiliates also allows for analysis
that controls for a variety of potentially confounding
factors.
This rich data source creates two distinct research
opportunities. First, new insights regarding financing
and operating decisions can be obtained by analyzing
decisionmaking in different institutional settings. Sec-
ond, examining the internal markets of multinational
firms promises to generate new insights into how firms
structure their worldwide operations and how policies
can impact those decisions. The remainder of this arti-
cle summarizes our research on the internal markets of
I. For a discussion of the most recent data collected, see Raymond J.
Mataloni ]r. and Daniel R. Yorgason, “Operations of U.S. Multinational
Companies: Preliminary Results From the 2004 Benchmark Survey," Suavrr
or CURRENT BUSINESS 86 (November 2006): 37—68. For general information
on the statistics that are available on U.S. multinational firms, see Raymond
J. Mataloni ]r., “A Guide to BEA Statistics on U.S. Multinational Compa-
nies,” Suavar 65 (March 1995): 38—55.
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multinational firms in the following areas:
0 Ownership decisions
oWeak investor protection and shallow capital mar-
kets
o Dividend policies
0 Capital controls
0 Currency depreciations
Ownership Decisions
One of the most fundamental decisions firms face
when expanding abroad is whether to organize foreign
operations as joint ventures or as wholly owned affili-
ates. Multinational firms frequently have the option to
own 100 percent, majority, or minority shares of for-
eign entities. It is widely believed that the forces of glo-
balization make the use of joint ventures particularly
attractive, but this presumption rests on aspects of the
ownership decisions of American multinational firms
that, until recently, were not rigorously examined.
“The Costs of Shared Ownership: Evidence From
International Joint Ventures” provides a comprehen-
sive review of U.S. overseas affiliate activity from 1982
to 1997, offering evidence that over time American
worldwide production through greater intrafirm trade
creates the potential for conflict with local partners
over sourcing decisions and transfer pricing. Because
multinational firms increasingly rely on worldwide tax
planning, global technology transfer, and production
decentralization, they face growing incentives to avoid
sharing ownership with local partners.
Wholly owned foreign affiliates of U.S. companies
have considerably greater financial and commercial
ties to their U.S. parent companies than do partially
owned foreign affiliates. However, this cross-sectional
evidence that whole ownership is associated with close
coordination of parent and affiliate activity does not
prove that ownership decisions are functions of coor-
dination costs. Another possibility is that both owner-
ship and operational decisions are responses to other
unmeasured factors. In distinguishing these two inter-
pretations of the same evidence, we identify exogenous
changes in ownership levels and trace their effects on
intrafirm transactions. By principles of symmetry (im-
plied by the theory of the firm), any effects of owner-
ship on intrafirm transactions should be mirrored by
equal effects of intrafirm transactions on ownership
decisions. Our analysis examines two changes in gov-
ernment policy that affected the relative costs of shar-
ing ownership—the liberalization of foreign
ownership restrictions and tax penalties on joint ven-
tures featured in the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986. Our
results indicate that affiliates operating in liberalizing
countries and firms whose joint ventures would be
subject to tax penalties after 1986 both engaged in
greater intrafirm transactions after the reforms.
These reactions imply that the increased desire to
coordinate parent and affiliate trade, technology trans-
fers, and tax planning that has been evident over the
44 Research Spotlight
March 2007
last 20 years contributed to the rising appetite for con-
trol over worldwide operations. Our estimates imply
that between one-fifth and three-fifths of the decline in
the use of partial ownership by multinational firms
over the sample period is attributable to the increased
importance of intrafirm transactions. These findings
indicate that the forces of globalization have dimin-
ished rather than accelerated the use of shared owner-
ship.
Weak lnvestor Protection and
Shallow Capital Markets
Capital market conditions differ markedly around the
world. Some countries offer legal protections and sup-
portive regulation that produce liquid capital markets
of the type found in the United States, whereas others
have legal structures or regulatory policies that pro-
duce extremely shallow capital markets. These differ-
ences influence the capital structure choices that firms
make. Empirical attempts to study these issues face sig-
nificant challenges. Recent efforts using cross-country
samples of local firms exploit the rich variation that in-
ternational comparisons offer, but these efforts have
with higher affiliate leverage. Higher inflation is associ-
ated with more external borrowing and less internal
borrowing. Finally, higher corporate tax rates are asso-
ciated with higher leverage. The analysis also reveals
that borrowing from parent companies responds more
sharply to tax rate differences than borrowing from ex—
ternal sources, suggesting that firms are better able to
exploit internal capital markets than external capital
markets when structuring optimal financing in re-
sponse to tax differences.
In general, we found that firms use internal capital
markets opportunistically when external finance is
costly and when there are tax planning opportunities.
Chart 1. Relationship Between Creditor Rights
and Types of Affiliate Borrowing, 1994
Percent
60
I External borrowing to assets ratio
so I Borrowing from parents to assets ratio
Creditor rights index
equal to tour
Creditor rights index
equal to zero
Note. This chart presents the median debt ratios lor alfiliates in countries with a creditor rights index
of zero or tour. The ratio ol borrowing trom U.S. parents to assets is the ratio at net current liabilities
and long-term debt borrowed lrom U.S. parents to total assets, as measured in the 1994 benchmark
survey. External bonowmg to assets is the ratio ol current liabilities and long-term debt borrowed
trom nonparent sources to total assets. as measured in the 1994 benchmark survey. The creditor
rights index is lrom Hatael La Porta. Florencia Lopez-de-Silanes. Andrei Shleiler, and Robert
Vishny. ‘Law and Finance.” Journal otPolitrce/Eoonomy 106 (1998): 1.113-1.155.
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The results suggest that internal capital markets may
give multinational firms an advantage over local firms
in countries with poorly developed credit markets. Lo-
cal firms that borrow from external sources face high
costs of debt in countries with shallow capital markets
or weak creditor rights. Although weak credit markets
also reduce external borrowing by multinational firms,
these firms can draw on resources from internal capital
markets to obtain needed financing.
Dividend Policies
Dividend payments from U.S.-owned foreign affiliates
to U.S. parent companies represent sizable financial
flows. In 1999, public U.S. corporations had after-tax
earnings of $516 billion and paid $198 billion in divi-
dends to common shareholders.2 In the same year, for-
eign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms had after-tax
earnings of $182 billion and paid $97 billion to the
their parents as dividends. Indeed, the partial tax holi-
day featured in the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act
was motivated by the prospect that large dividend pay-
ments from the foreign affiliates of U.S.-owned multi-
national firms would have favorable macroeconomic
mization.
Circumstances may lead parent companies to seek
cash dividends from their foreign affiliates to satisfy
domestic financing and investment needs. A simple
comparison of multinational firms illustrates such a
motivation for dividend policies within multinational
firms. Chart 2 displays shares of parent companies re-
ceiving dividend payments from their foreign affiliates,
where parent companies are grouped according to
their ratios of dividend payouts to external sharehold-
ers (as a fraction of after-tax earnings). The heights of
the bars in chart 2 measure fractions of parent compa-
nies receiving dividends from their affiliates. Parent
companies with the highest external dividend payout
ratios are the most likely to receive dividends from
their foreign affiliates. This simple association also ap-
pears in a regression analysis that controls for various
confounding factors. Parent companies require cash to
pay dividends to external shareholders and foreign af-
filiates often represent ready sources of cash, ones that
Chart 2. Share of Parents Receiving
Dividends from Affiliates
Percent
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Ratio oi parent dividends (to shareholders) to parent net income
Nora This chart presents the share oi U.S. parents rewivmg dividends irom therr torsion aifiirales grouped
on the basis 01 their dividend payout ratio (dividends paid to common shareholders divided by net income)
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are particularly attractive to firms that would face high
costs of raising funds externally. The analysis also re-
veals that financially constrained parents in industries
with attractive investment opportunities are particu-
larly likely to receive dividends from foreign affiliates.
Hence, it seems that dividend payments from foreign
affiliates are often used to satisfy parent company cash
needs.
Finally, dividend payments from foreign affiliates
appear to play a role in monitoring the activities of for-
eign managers. Regular dividend payments can restrict
the financial discretion of foreign managers, mitigating
whatever agency problems may exist within firms.
Conflicts of interest between managers of foreign affil-
iates and managers of parent companies are likely to be
most pronounced when the parent company owns
only a fractional share of the affiliate, as other owners
may be tempted to transact with the affiliate at non-
market prices. Consequently, parent companies have
incentives to require steady flows of dividend pay-
ments in order to limit the scope of potential malfea-
controls. Affiliates in countries imposing capital con-
trols have 5.2-percent lower reported profit rates than
comparable affiliates in countries without capital con-
trols, reflecting in part trade and financing practices
that reallocate income within a firm. The distortions to
reported profitability are comparable with those that
stem from a 27-percent difference in corporate tax
rates. Dividend repatriations are also regularized to fa-
cilitate the extraction of profits from countries impos-
ing capital controls.
Evidence of the impact of removing capital controls
is consistent with the comparisons of foreign affiliates
located in countries with and without capital controls.
U.S.-owned foreign affiliates in countries with capital
controls experience 6.9—percent faster annual growth
of property, plant, and equipment investment after the
liberalization of controls, indicating that capital con-
trols impose significant burdens on foreign investors.
There is, however, no discernible effect of the imposi-
tion or removal of capital controls on the volatility of
affiliate profitability or the volatility of affiliate growth
rates. Hence, it appears that capital controls are re-
sponsible for slow growth of U.S.-owned affiliates, and
local reported profit rates significantly below those re-
ported elsewhere.
Currency Depreciations
Settings where investment opportunities and financial
constraints move in identifiable ways provide valuable
opportunities to study the impact of financial con-
straints on firm growth. Because firms typically incur
some costs in local currency terms, currency deprecia-
tions are hypothesized to provide improved invest-
ment opportunities. Firms differ, however, in their
access to financial resources at the time of the depreci-
ation. A comparison of the investment responses to
March 2007
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currency depreciations by firms with differential access
to financial resources can illustrate the degree to which
financial constraints can limit growth. This compari-
son, given its setting, can also help explain why hy-
pothesized benefits of depreciations are often not
manifest.
In the paper “Financial Constraints and Growth:
Multinational and Local Firm Responses to Currency
Depreciations,” the effects of sharp currency deprecia-
tions on the behavior of U.S.-owned affiliates and local
firms in the tradable sectors of emerging markets are
compared.5 The differential response of local firms and
multinational affiliates is manifest in the simple com-
parison provided in chart 3. In this chart, the bars rep-
resent annual growth rates in assets in the year prior to
a sharp depreciation and subsequent years for local
firms and multinational affiliates. This basic difference
between local firms and multinational affiliates is ro-
bust. Regression analysis demonstrates that U.S.-
owned affiliates increase sales 5.4 percent, and assets
7.5 percent, more than local firms after currency de-
 and
lS. The
vestment by larger amounts, but affiliates that exclu-
sively serve the local market increase investment by
considerably more than local firms. Large differences
in the investment responses of affiliates and local firms
persist after including measures of operating exposure
as controls.
Given the evidence on the opportunistic use of in-
ternal capital markets by multinational firms discussed
above, it is possible that a superior ability to overcome
financing constraints is the reason for the better post-
depreciation performance of U.S.-owned affiliates.
Tests reveal that financing constraints play a decisive
role in explaining the differential investment response
of multinational affiliates and local firms. Following
currency depreciations, the leverage of local firms in-
creases more than the leverage of multinational affili-
ates, in part reflecting the tendency of local firms to
borrow in foreign currency terms. Local firms with the
most leverage and with the shortest term debt reduce
investment the most. The examination of the internal
capital markets of multinationals shows that multina—
tional parents provide additional financing in response
to sharp currency depreciations. These results indicate
that multinational firms overcome the negative conse-
quences of large depreciations by avoiding the financial
constraints that handicap local firms.
In addition to offering a test of how financial con-
straints influence investment, this evidence illustrates
an effect of foreign direct investment not previously
emphasized. The internal capital markets of multina-
tional firms allow their affiliates to expand output after
severe currency depreciations, precisely when econo-
mies are fragile and prone to severe economic contrac-
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tions. As a consequence, multinational affiliates may
be able to mitigate some of the aggregate effects of cur-
rency crises. This analysis does not consider the long-
run distributional consequences of the differential im-
pact of currency crises on multinational affiliates. In-
creased multinational activity during crises may help
support local firms through spillover effects, such as
increased demand for local inputs or improved access
to technology or trade credit. However, multinationals
could also use crises to expand at the expense of local
firms with potentially persistent effects. While the in-
ternal capital markets of multinational firms appear to
mitigate the contractionary output effects of severe
currency depreciations, the longer term effects on local
firms remain an open question.
Conclusion
The data collected by BEA in its surveys of interna-
tional direct investment provide a unique window on
the internal markets of U.S. multinational firms.
Our analyses of BEA’s firm-level data reveal that the
increased importance of internal capital markets has
reduced the use of joint ventures; that multinational
